I’ve recently been interested in thinking of masculinity in terms of Aristotelian virtue ethics (“virtue” — after all — comes from the latin word virtus, which itself means something akin to manliness or masculinity), and specifically how masculinity as a virtue would be situated as a golden mean between two vices. These vices would be an excess of the virtue and a deficit of it. This analysis can begin in a variety of ways: thinking of the vice of an excess of masculinity; thinking of the vice of a deficit of masculinity; thinking of contexts in which we normally think of masculinity as a virtue and distilling the key characteristics out of that; looking at cross-cultural archetypes; looking at historical and anthropological examples of masculinity as a virtue; figuring out what masculinity is not. A common problem between each of these approaches is that almost any analysis is going to be culturally or morally subjective. Distilling a universal, non-moralized theme between these is difficult, to say the least.
I just finished Jack Donovan’s short book The Way of Men, which primarily deals with Donovan’s attempt to formulate such a universal definition or framework for masculinity. Though I don’t agree with everything in the book, Donovan presents an articulate and nuanced case for thinking of masculinity (or “manliness,” Donovan uses the two interchangeably) as a set of virtues, which he calls “the tactical virtues.” Donovan’s conception of masculinity is largely couched in historical and anthropological narratives, and heavily relies upon the idea that modern institutions, norms, and mores evolved much faster than human beings possibly could and that we are essentially just large chimps playing around with institutions.
Even if one finds Donovan’s tactical virtues conception of masculinity objectionable or misguided, it raises interesting perspectives that are useful when building a descriptive account (if not a normative one) of what masculinity entails or historically entailed. The book reads well for lay audiences and makes use of a highly personal and casual tone, and includes footnotes where necessary. There are at least several useful observations that come out of reading it.
Guardian-Warrior Status Throughout Nature
As noted above, Donovan’s account is largely anthropological and historical, and rests on a back-to-nature analysis. For the descriptive part it is playing, this is a useful way of thinking about how a central conception of masculinity could have evolved. There are potential problems with taking this as a normative analysis — largely because it would boil down to an appeal to nature.
Men have historically played the role of guardian-warrior in human communities, largely due to the biological predisposition for men to be larger and stronger than women and the lower fixed costs of reproduction for men. Whereas women historically play an important role as intra-social protectors, men play the role as inter-social protectors in anything from chimpanzee communities to hunter-gatherer societies to classical and medieval societies and industrial society. As technology progresses and the fixed costs of childrearing and the biological advantages given to men are compensated for, the roles which have evolved for the feminine and masculine.
This Guardian-Warrior status is exemplified in four tactical virtues.
The Tactical Virtues
Donovan’s tactical virtues include strength, honor, courage, and mastery. Each of these takes on its own meaning in specific cultures, but the author insists they have core, universal meanings. While different cultures will have slightly different conceptions of each, totally redefining each of these virtues is something that can only be done when totally removed from their historical contexts.
Strength, for example, can and may include non-physical strength as an extension, or as a secondary, form of strength. Donovan wants to reject the idea that one can be physically weak and still be strong in the sense that is important for masculinity, though. Any non-physical strength can only be a secondary version, and any attempts to redefine strength primarily as non-physical is ahistorical and an anomaly on his account. The ability to cultivate non-physical strength usually rests on the use of physical strength (if not by the subject, then by an enforcer of some sort removed from the subject, like police, security forces, militia, or the military).
Similarly, honor is not the same as simply being good at something (e.g., being on the honor roll at school), but is more deeply rooted in one’s ability to gain the esteem of other men. This can easily be illustrated in the utility of dueling up until the 20th century. A man would challenge another to a duel when his honor was challenged or deprecated in public. To a large extent, honor is the ability to not only gain the esteem of other men, but also to evoke fear when necessary. Honor is not an ability to follow social norms or mores on this account. This explication of honor removes it from a morally-charged analysis (see usefulness below).
“Darth Vader is not a pussy.”
Think of cultural archetypes for masculinity or manliness. Indiana Jones is a strong, honorable, courageous, and masterful character. As are James Bond, Rocky, Theodore Roosevelt, and Alexander the Great (at least on the traditional accounts of these historical characters).
So is Darth Vader.
Perhaps the most important insight from Donovan’s analysis is pulling apart the questions of “what does it mean to be good at being masculine/manly/a man?” and “what does it mean to be a good man?” The latter asks what it means to fulfill the role of a good man within a given societal context. The former asks what it means to fulfill the role of an ideal man within a given societal context. The two are vastly different questions, and Donovan succinctly summarizes their difference with the memorable line, “Darth Vader is not a pussy.”
A person can be a morally bad person and still be manly. This is one of the advantages of the descriptive account — it does not come with normative baggage — though it can also be difficult to swallow. “Real men do X!” is a common phrase when the subject of masculinity comes up, and X usually is tightly connected to whatever moral framework the person talking has, or whatever agenda they may identify with (e.g., “real men don’t catcall!” “real men aren’t afraid to talk to women on the street!” “real men serve their country overseas!” “real men aren’t afraid to wear a dress!” “real men don’t wear pink!” The agendas go on and on). This account merely maintains that a “real man,” i.e., somebody who is masculine, exhibits the four tactical virtues.
This does not mean that a masculine man does not have to be a bad person, of course. It simply means that whatever it means to “be a good man,” usually just applies to people as a whole. “Good men are responsible,” doesn’t say much, because good people in general ought to be responsible. Most of the moral prerogatives that one wishes to assign to the role of the masculine are actually fairly gender-neutral.
The Masculine Extreme: Androphilia?
If masculinity is placed on a spectrum with femininity (which I am not convinced it is), with masculinity at one end and femininity at the other end, then the most masculine men — those who reject feminine characteristics and attraction to those characteristics completely and totally — will be gay. If one is so totally engrossed in masculine ideas and attraction to them and their embodiment in nature, then one will not be attracted to the embodiment of feminine ideas. This is known as androphilia — attraction to masculinity (Donovan actually has a separate book on this subject, Androphilia, which I have not read). Similarly, a complete rejection of masculinity and masculine ideas and ideals is gynephilia — attraction to femininity. This is an implication of masculinity being on a spectrum with femininity and with the ends being mutually exclusive of each other.
A possible question raised by this paradigm is whether or not heterosexual men are lacking in masculinity and share feminine characteristics (if not externally, at least internally in the ideas and characteristics to which they are attracted in a mate). Additionally, if masculinity and femininity do not exist on a spectrum, how else can they exist? Can one exhibit total masculinity while simultaneously maintaining certain feminine characteristics or traits? In other words: is the opposite of masculinity femininity? Is the opposite of femininity masculinity?
If the historical masculine role is the inter-social guardian (i.e., paternalism) and the historical feminine role is the intra-social guardian (i.e., maternalism) then can a man exhibit total inter-social guardian traits while simultaneously exhibiting some intra-social guardian traits?
Final thoughts — Masculinity: A Composite Virtue?
If masculinity exists as at least honor, courage, mastery, and strength, can it be said that it is the sum or composite of these four independent virtues? In a different way, can these be said to be merely necessary conditions for masculinity, or are they necessary and sufficient conditions? The Darth Vader example above gives intuitive weight to them being the necessary and sufficient conditions for masculinity, but I am tempted to say there is a moderating component here which can be taken from the Aristotelian perspective. Exhibiting too little or too much of one of these virtues takes away from the sum total virtue of masculinity (imagine a man who is too excited to put his life on the line — can this be said to be a detriment to his masculinity?).
Also important to note that masculinity need not be purely violent, tribe-like on this account. It can be simulated (e.g., fraternal organizations, competitiveness, and “guardian” roles), vicarious (e.g., spectator sports, literature, video games), and intellectualized (e.g., economic, political, metaphorical, ascetic).
While one need not agree with all of Donovan’s normative conclusion from The Way of Men, it gives good intellectual fodder for thinking of what masculinity is and means.